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We conducted a multi-wave field experiment to study the interaction of peer effects and self-
control among undergraduate students. We use a behavioral measure of self-control based on 
whether students achieve study related goals they have set for themselves. 
We find that both self-control and the number of talented friends increase students’ 
performance. We then set out to test the theoretical prediction of Battaglini, Bénabou and 
Tirole (2005) that (only) sufficiently self-controlled individuals profit from interactions with 
peers. We find that peers with high self-control are more likely to connect to others, have a 
higher overall number of friends and have a higher number of talented friends. Moreover, 
positive news about self-controlled behavior of their peers increases students’ own 
perseverance. Hence, our findings are consistent with the model of Battaglini, Bénabou and 
Tirole. In addition, we find that female students are more likely to have high self-control, but 
do not outperform male students. One reason for this is that female students have a lower 
number of talented friends than their male counterparts, thereby profiting less from positive 
peer effects. 
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Successful performance, be it in school or at university, at the job or in leisure 
activities, depends both on persistence in what one is doing and on knowledge about how it is 
to be done. Persistence requires self-control, i.e., the ability to resist temptations to 
procrastinate; while knowledge of how to best achieve a goal can be acquired from more 
advanced peers. How self-control – or the lack thereof – can influence behavior and finally 
performance is studied by the literature on present-biased preferences1; whereas a mostly 
empirical literature on peer effects investigates how an individual’s achievement depends on 
her relation to her peers.2 We contribute to both strands of the literature by providing the first 
experimental study on how peer effects in social networks interact with individual self-
control. Combining a field experiment with surveys, we show that more self-controlled 
students are better connected to their peers, have better access to highly talented peers and 
write better exam grades than students with low self-control. 
Present-biased preferences lead to self-control problems that affect performance: For 
instance, a student might want to study hard in the evening in order to be well prepared for 
class the next day. However, when evening actually arrives, the now immediate psychological 
costs from studying become much more salient than the still relatively far-away benefit from 
being well prepared, and the student is severely tempted to go out instead. More generally, if 
a disproportionally high weight is attached to whatever costs or benefits would accrue 
immediately, then plans implying that investments precede benefits will be likely to fail due 
to the temptation to avoid immediate costs. Since performance plans typically are of this kind, 
a present bias can impede performance.  
But performance also depends on the interaction with peers: Peers with high levels of 
human capital can improve the performance of their friends in multiple ways, for instance, by 
intentionally or unintentionally providing them with important information or acting as a role 
model. Importantly, individual self-control might mediate the access to peers with high levels 
of human capital. For instance, if connecting to peers and maintaining these links in the long 
run requires self-control, or if only sufficiently self-controlled individuals can profit from 
                                                 
1 For theoretical contributions see, e.g., Strotz (1955), Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Ainslie and Haslam (1992), 
Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Bénabou and Pycia (2002), and 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006). Recent experimental contributions on time preferences include Ariely and 
Wertenbroch (2002), Andersen et al. (2008), Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger 
(2012). 
2 See, e.g. Hoxby (2000), Hoxby and Weingarth (2005), Zimmerman (2003), Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and 
Moretti (2009), and Calvo-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009). The latter combines theory and empirics to 
investigate peer effects in an educational setting.  
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friends with high levels of human capital, then self-control will not only have a direct but also 
an indirect effect on performance that is mediated by peer effects. 
Despite this rather obvious possibility, the literatures on self-control and peer effects 
have hitherto remained separated. One notable exception is the contribution of Battaglini, 
Bénabou and Tirole (2005). Their theory of peer effects on self-control provides us with our 
main hypotheses. In their model, individuals have imperfect knowledge about their own self-
control, but know that levels of self-control are positively correlated within their peer group. 
Hence, observing how peers react to temptations provides individuals with additional 
information about their own level of self-control. This, in turn, affects their self-confidence 
and consequently the degree to which they themselves exhibit self-controlled behavior in the 
future. Intuitively, observing how peers can handle similar challenges to their willpower can 
be encouraging or discouraging (“if he can do it, then so can I” or “if not even he can do it, 
then I do not even have to try”). The theory of Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole (2005) can 
explain the existence and workings of self-help groups, but also applies more broadly, 
including our context of students’ learning groups. In our field experiment, we elicit both the 
individual self-control and the social network of our students and provide them with 
information about the self-control of some of their peers. Our findings are consistent with the 
theory provided by Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole (2005). In particular, we find evidence for 
their prediction that individuals with low self-control remain unconnected to their peers while 
individuals with sufficiently high self-control connect to them. In addition, we find that 
connectedness improves performance, which is in line with both the theory and the empirical 
results of Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009). Specifically, we find that it is 
connectedness to talented friends that matters in improving performance. 
The existing empirical and experimental literature on self-control has so far mainly 
studied the – direct – relation between self-control and performance. In a field experiment 
with students, Wong (2008) finds that time-consistent behavior in midterm preparation is 
positively correlated with students’ performance. Bucciol, Houser and Piovesan (2011) find 
that consumption temptations are detrimental for the performance of younger children but 
leaves the performance of older children unchanged. Empirical evidence for negative effects 
of self-control problems on various important outcomes is provided by DellaVigna and 
Malmendier (2006), Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) and Ameriks et al. (2007). We contribute 
to this literature in two ways. First, we confirm its general finding that self-control enhances 
performance. Second, and more importantly, we provide evidence for an indirect relation 
between self-control and performance which is mediated by connectedness to talented peers. 
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Our paper is also related to a literature that has studied whether commitment devices 
can help overcome self-control problems. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) study the effect of 
self-imposed and externally-imposed deadlines on performance in another field experiment. 
They show that both (evenly-spaced) externally-imposed and self-imposed deadlines have a 
positive effect on performance. However, as Burger, Charness and Lynham (2011) find in a 
related field experiment, externally-imposed deadlines do not always increase performance. 
Houser et al. (2010) conducted a laboratory experiment to elicit individuals’ willingness to 
pay for commitment in a game in which the participants repeatedly face temptations. The 
authors find that the average willingness to pay is positive and the choice of whether or not to 
buy commitment depends on the costs of the commitment device in question. Our 
contribution to this literature is mainly methodological and consists in the way we construct 
our behavioral measure of self-control: We categorize those individuals as possessing high 
levels of self-control who stick to their self-imposed deadlines and who, after buying costly 
partial commitment, do not violate it afterwards. In particular, students are classified as 
exhibiting low self-control if they do not manage to hand in their midterm homework before a 
non-binding deadline they had chosen at the beginning of the semester, or if they missed out a 
micro workshop in which they had previously enrolled. To our knowledge, we are the first to 
combine within one study the experimental measurement of self-control with the 
measurement of subjects’ social network. 
The empirical literature on peer effects has proposed different methods to solve the 
standard identification problems as outlined by Manski (1993). Possible approaches to 
overcome these problems include random assignment to a group or to a treatment, the use of 
non-linear models or network models. All approaches incorporate the assumption that an 
individual’s outcome is determined by the mean outcome and characteristics of her peers.3 
Recent studies that find a positive relation between being observed by peers and individual 
performance are, e.g., Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti (2009). By contrast, our 
focus is not on how observability by peers affects performance. Rather, we study how 
observing peers, in particular their self-control, affects individual goal-setting.4 We find that 
goals are increasing in observed self-control of peers. 
While our main focus is on self-control and peer effects, we also contribute to the 
experimental literature on gender differences. Surprisingly, we find that women profit less 
                                                 
3 Three notable exceptions are the empirical study of Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009), the field 
experiment by Falk and Ichino (2006) and the natural experiment by Sacerdote (2001). 
4 For a theoretical approach on how commitment or goals can improve self-control, see, e.g., Bryan, Karlan and 
Nelson (2010), Koch and Nafziger (2011), Suvorov and Van de Ven (2008) and Noor (2011). 
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from positive peer effects than men with comparable levels of human capital: Although 
women have more self-control than men, they do not outperform the latter. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we derive our 
hypotheses, mainly referring to the theory provided by Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole (2005). 
Section 3 reports our experimental design and section 4 our main results, including our 
findings on the relation between the social network characteristics of (male and female) 
students and peer effects on performance. In section 5, we first describe our experimental 
intervention by which we inform students about highly self-controlled behavior of their peers 
and then report the results. We discuss our findings and conclude in section 6. 
2 Hypotheses 
Individuals who achieve their goals are typically more self-controlled than those who 
set the same goals but fail to achieve them. We use this insight to implement a behavioral 
measure of self-control in our experiment. In theory, individuals learn from their experience 
and adjust their goal-setting behavior to their perceived level of self-control.5 Consequently, a 
behavioral measure of self-control can best be obtained from goal achievement at early stages 
of this learning process, i.e., from observing how well individuals not yet fully informed 
about their own self-control relate to their early goals. Hence, we (behaviorally) equate high 
self-control with a high level of early goal achievement.  
We are now in a position to formulate our first two hypotheses: 
 
H1 Performance increases in self-control, i.e., in early goal achievement. 
H2 Individuals with high self-control invest more effort into achieving their goals 
than individuals with low self-control. 
 
Our main question is how self-control interacts with one’s position in a social network 
and thereby with standard peer effects. The only existing theory that addresses this question is 
provided by Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole (2005), henceforth BBT. Their results show that 
only sufficiently self-controlled individuals profit from the interaction with peers; but they 
profit more from peers who are similar to them in terms of self-control. When individuals can 
anticipate the benefits that arise from forming connections (cf. Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), 
two testable predictions of the BBT model are, first, that only sufficiently self-controlled 
                                                 
5 For a theory on learning self-control in a dynamic setting, see Ali (2011). 
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individuals have a strictly positive number of links to others, and, second, that self-control is 
correlated among direct friends.  
The BBT model does not account for human capital. However, it is easy to see how an 
extended reasoning along its lines can be used to bridge the gap between the literature on self-
control and the literature on how human capital of peers can affect achievement: Since self-
controlled people tend to persist in their performance plans, they tend to acquire more human 
capital. Consequently, they become more valuable peers with regard to the peer effects on 
achievement that can be expected from them. If indeed only sufficiently self-controlled 
individuals connect with others, as the BBT model suggests, then only sufficiently self-
controlled individuals will enjoy positive peer effects on their performance. Hence, we 
hypothesize: 
 
H3 Performance increases in the number of talented friends. 
H4 People with high self-control (a) are more likely to connect to others, (b) have 
a higher overall number of friends, and (c) have a higher number of talented 
friends. 
 
If we look deeper into the BBT model, an even subtler way emerges in which 
individual self-control and connections to peers affect each other: Not only does self-control 
affect the individuals’ social network (and thereby their access to positive peer effects on 
performance); but it does so because peers also affect self-control itself. Individuals profit 
from good news about the self-control of their peers: By increasing their prior about their own 
ability to retain self-control, observable self-controlled behavior of their peers increases 
individuals’ effort to resist temptations. By contrast, bad news about their peers’ self-control 
harms individuals by decreasing their confidence in their own ability to resist temptations, 
making them more likely to give in. For ethical reasons, we can only test the good-news 
prediction. In particular, we hypothesize that effort is increasing in the revealed effort of 
peers. Besides actual effort, also planned effort can be considered since goal-setting is one 
way to invest into self-control. Thus, we additionally conjecture that good news about the 
self-control of one’s peers increases self-set goals while bad news lowers them. Our last 
hypothesis is: 
 
H5 Planned effort (a self-set goal) and actual effort both increase in revealed 




3 Experimental Design and Implementation 
3.1 Experimental Procedure 
 
We conducted our experiment in an undergraduate microeconomics course at the University 
of Hamburg in the summer semester of 2013.6 In total, 117 first-year students regularly 
participated in the lecture and the tutorials.  
Our experiment was conducted in the following five waves: 
1. Survey on aspired course grades and current study time  
2. Survey on intermediate goals and partial communication of others' study time 
per week  
3. Measurement of intermediate goal achievement 
4. Elicitation of students’ social network and preferences  
5. Exam 
 
In the first two waves, we conducted surveys and implemented one experimental 
intervention in the tutorial classes. In the fourth wave, we conducted a paper-and-pencil 
experiment and the final survey in the lecture class. Students could never anticipate upcoming 
waves, and they were not told before the beginning of the fourth wave that they were part of 
an experiment. Rather, they were told that some faculty wanted to analyze students' learning 
conditions and study behavior. Moreover, the experimenters who actually entered classes 
were not involved in teaching the lecture or tutorial courses.7 The teaching assistants were 
informed about who would enter their classes on which days and were told that the 
interventions they witnessed were part of a study on student behavior.8 They have never been 
informed about the fourth wave of the experiment or about the purpose of the first three 
waves before the end of the semester. Furthermore, they were instructed not to provide 
possible interpretations of our study to the students. Apparently students accepted our 
                                                 
6 In Hamburg, like in most German cities, courses in the summer semester are taught from beginning of April to 
mid July. 
7 The experimental team that actually entered the classes to conduct the experiment consisted of two of the three 
authors of this paper. The third author, Lydia Mechtenberg, committed both not to act as an experimenter in class 
and not to receive the data set in a non-anonymized form, since she was the lecturer of the microeconomics 
course. Exams were graded by the teaching assistants who did not know the purpose of the study and never 
received access to the data set.  
8 In the second wave, they announced the modalities of handing in the mid-term problem set as a natural part of 
their teaching job. These modalities were designed for experimental purposes about which, however, the 
teaching assistants were not informed. 
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explanation of the interventions in their classes and never approached an experimenter or 
teaching assistant on this issue. All material used for the experimental interventions and 
surveys is collected in Appendix B.9  
The first wave In the first wave, we conducted a survey in each tutorial, asking 
which grades students aspired to and how many minutes they on average studied per week for 
this specific course.  
The second wave The second wave was mainly dedicated to induce students to set 
goals for themselves at a relatively early stage of the course, since their behavior with respect 
to these goals allows us to measure students’ self-control at a later point in time. This wave 
consists of three steps which were conducted in the tutorials. Each teaching assistant 
announced that several organizational issues were to be settled within the ongoing session of 
the tutorial course.  
1st step: Planned effort We confronted students with a signal about the maximal 
time a peer in their tutorial has studied (the details of this intervention are described in section 
5.1) and asked in a survey how much students planned to study per week for this course in the 
future. Hence, we elicited individual self-set goals.  
2nd step: Intermediate goal with partial commitment Next, a senior student who 
was not informed about the purpose or content of our study entered the tutorial course and 
truthfully explained to the students that they could enroll in a non-compulsory one-day micro 
workshop. Moreover, he mentioned that enrolment was not obligatory for participants but that 
each student who, though enrolled, would not show up for the workshop would have to pay a 
fee of 3 EUR. By contrast, participation, both with and without enrolment, was free of charge. 
It was also made clear that payment of the fee would be asserted.10 Hence, students were 
offered a pre-designed goal (participating in the workshop) together with a commitment 
device (the fee). Then, the senior student distributed enrolment forms that again mentioned 
the fee and provided the link to a website where online enrolment for the workshop was 
possible. Finally, he collected the enrolment forms and left the class. 
3rd step: Intermediate goal without commitment The teaching assistant truthfully 
explained to his students that they had to submit a compulsory midterm assignment in order to 
be eligible for the final exam. This assignment – a standard problem set – was identical for all 
students. The quality of the solution was not decisive for students’ admission to the final 
                                                 
9 The material was originally written in German. In Appendix B, we collect the English translations. Format and 
design of the original material are preserved.  
10In fact, teaching assistants and the experimental team collected the fee within the three weeks after the 
workshop and, if necessary, immediately after the exam. 
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exam; but their solution had to fulfill the minimum requirement of being a recognizable 
attempt to solve all problems of the problem set. The teaching assistant explained to his 
students that they had to choose between two submission deadlines, an early and a late one, 
which were neutrally framed. He distributed forms on which the two deadlines were specified 
and the students were asked to individually choose their preferred deadline. Hence, students 
were offered the possibility of regulating their own future learning behavior by choosing the 
goal of submitting early. Students were told that their choice was not binding but helpful for 
organizational purposes. They were also told that assignments handed in after the late 
deadline would not be considered and excluded the students from the possibility of taking the 
exam. This information was provided online, too, and was repeated several times in the 
lecture to make sure that all students enrolled would understand it. To provide a (weak) 
incentive for students to choose the early deadline, online feedback about the quality of their 
solution of the midterm assignment was promised to students who submitted prior to the early 
deadline. No feedback was provided to students who submitted prior to the late but after the 
early deadline. However, any category of students always had the opportunity to approach 
their teaching assistant after the tutorials or during the office hours to get any information 
about any exercise they needed help with. In addition, we instructed the teaching assistants 
not to provide the correct solutions of the midterm assignments in their online feedback. The 
online feedback did not provide any real advantage to the students who received it. 
The third wave The organizing team of the workshop collected the data about 
students’ enrolments and their actual participation and passed them on to the experimental 
team. The workshop took place on a weekend day after the third wave of the experiment. In 
its course, additional exercises related to the content of the micro course and prepared by the 
organizing team were discussed. The teaching assistants collected all data about students’ 
choices of a submission deadline and registered whether students’ actually submitted before 
the chosen deadline. Again, all data were passed on to the experimental team.  
The fourth wave The main purpose of the fourth wave was to elicit students’ 
networks. We conducted a final survey in which students were asked to name the peers with 
whom they had joined to prepare themselves for the exam (outside the official lectures and 
tutorials). These lists of names allow us to reconstruct the social network of learning 
relationships within class.11 For each of the listed friends some further survey questions 
                                                 
11 Literally, the social network is directed because some students are mentioned by others who do not mention 
them. However, it seems more reasonable to consider learning relations as bilateral and to believe that two 
students have learned together even if only one of them reports this, e.g., because the other learning partner was 
absent on the day on which we conducted the final survey. 
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specified the kind of relationship, e.g., since when they know each other. We also asked how 
they perceived their own, their peers’, and other students’ degree of self-control.12 Moreover, 
we elicited their risk preferences for different contexts (among others finance, job, leisure) 
using the risk module initially implemented in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) in 
2004 (see Wagner, Frick and Schupp 2007). Before the survey, students participated in a 
paper-and-pencil experiment in which we elicited their time preferences in a context of 
choices between small short-term payoffs and larger payoffs that would be paid out at more 
far-away points in the future. To this purpose, we used ten incentivized decisions following 
the non-parametric method recently introduced by Takeuchi (2011). All payoffs were paid out 
by online delivery of Amazon vouchers.  
 The fifth wave Students wrote the final exam either at the beginning or at the 
end of the semester break. Thereby they could score between 0 and 90 points.13  
3.2  Key Measures  
Measuring performance, talent and effort We use the score in the final exam to 
measure performance, since it fully determines the overall course grades. We also obtained 
the scores (and grades) from a previous math course as a control variable for talent since a 
proficiency in math was important both for solving the preparatory problem sets and for doing 
well in the exam. To account for effort, we use self-reported study times both from the first 
and the fourth wave.  
Measuring self-control We constructed an indicator variable, self control, that 
measures whether a student behaved in a time-consistent way, i.e., achieved his own 
intermediate goals. A student’s two intermediate goals are to submit the midterm assignment 
prior to the deadline that she herself had previously chosen and to participate in the workshop 
in case that she had registered for participation. Among the 63 students who signed up for the 
micro workshop, a share of 73% (46 students) attended it. Early midterm assignment was 
planned by 107 students, but only a share of 73% (78 students) actually delivered early. The 
binary variable self control becomes one if the student both submitted prior to her self-chosen 
deadline and did not fail to attend the workshop if enrolled. This variable captures self-control 
well since it assigns low self-control to students who cannot resist the temptation to 
procrastinate when preparing the midterm assignment or the temptation to spend their week-
                                                 
12 Students reported their perceived degree of self-control on a scale between 0 and 10. 
13 Students who failed to pass at the early date were automatically eligible to write a new version of the exam at 
the end of the semester break. 
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end in a more agreeable way than by attending a workshop that they had planned to attend.14 
The basic assumption underlying the construction of the indicator variable is that, as implied 
by economic theory, the economic concept of self-control can be equated with time-consistent 
behavior.  
In order to test whether time-consistency is stable across different contexts, we used 
the method introduced by Takeuchi (2011) to construct a second self-control variable which 
measures individual time-preferences in the monetary context of our paper-and-pencil 
experiment (fourth wave).  
Measuring students’ social network position We created two different variables: 
friends and degree. The binary variable friends takes the value one if the student is at all 
connected to others, i.e., is part of a study group, and zero otherwise. The variable degree 
counts the student’s direct links to others, i.e. the number of learning partners.15 We computed 
both variables from the undirected social network. In order to check for robustness of our 
results we also use variables derived from the directed network. 
Differentiation of peers   To further substantiate friends’ peer effects we 
categorize them as talented or untalented according to their math score. The count variable 
talented friends counts the number of links to fellow students who have a math score weakly 
above 58 points, while the count variable untalented friends counts the number of links to 
fellow students who have a math score weakly below 55 points. The chosen threshold makes 
use of the fact that no student achieved a math score between 55 and 58; and it splits all 
friends in two categories of equal size.  
Descriptive statistics of our most important variables are provided in Table 1. 
4 Main Results 
4.1 Determinants of Performance 
Table 2 displays the results on how individual characteristics, including self-control, general 
connectedness to other students and specific connectedness to highly talented students affect 
performance. In all models, we tested for the presence of omitted variables with a 
specification-error test as well as for multicollinearity and rejected both. Moreover, ordinary 
least square (OLS) estimates were calculated with robust standard errors. We additionally 
                                                 
14 In principle, we can also construct two separate indicator variables for time-consistent behavior concerning 
each of the two intermediate goals. While many of our results are qualitatively unaffected, there is simply less 
variation in these two measures. 
15 Further network statistics, such as measures of centrality, are difficult to interpret since the network is quite 
sparse, consisting of many isolates and small components. 
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used a two-step FGLS (feasible generalized least square) method to account for 
heteroskedasticity and thus to gain efficiency. 
Self-control and talent Both individual self-control and talent have a positive 
effect on performance. Pairwise correlation of the dependent variable and these regressor 
variables yields a correlation coefficient of 0.66 (with a p-value smaller than 0.001) for talent 
and performance, while the correlation coefficient of self-control and performance is 0.30 
(with a p-value of 0.003). The effect of talent is significant at the 1% level across all model 
specifications. Self-control is statistically significant, albeit to a lesser degree. Being highly 
self-controlled is associated roughly with an eight points higher micro score, which is 
substantial since the maximal score is 90 and the median score is 58. The standard deviation 
of math score is 21 (reported in Table 1); an increase of one standard deviation in math score 
leads to a rise of 12 points in the micro score. 
These results fully support our hypothesis H1 that self-control positively affects 
performance. One important alternative suggestion would be that self control captures an 
advantage in human capital of those students who attended the workshop and received 
feedback after an early submission of their midterm assignment. To test whether this is true, 
we conducted a Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing the performance of those who attended 
the workshop and received the feedback with those who did not. The result is displayed in 
Table 3. There is no evidence that workshop attendance and feedback affected performance. 
Hence, we can be confident that the positive coefficient of the variable self control in Table 2 
does indeed measure a positive effect of actual self-control on performance. 
Self-control and peer effects The number of friends in general, measured by 
degree, has no significant effect on performance when controlling for talent and self-control 
(see columns 2 and 3 in Table 2). However, increasing the number of talented friends, i.e., 
friends with a high math score, significantly improves performance, which is fully in line with 
our hypothesis H3. If we control for the number of talented friends, the effect of self-control 
becomes weaker. Within the OLS regression the effect of self-control is of the same 
dimension but insignificant. In the FGLS model, the effect of self-control remains significant 
when controlling for the number of talented friends. Since overall model diagnostic statistics 
favor the FGLS model, we conclude that both self-control and being connected to many 
talented peers significantly improve performance. Overall, we find strong evidence in support 
of our hypotheses H1 and H3. 
Self-control and effort  One channel through which self-control might 
affect performance is effort. However, performance does not seem to be affected by early 
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effort, i.e., by the average number of minutes studied per week, as reported in the first wave 
of our experiment. On the other hand, late effort, i.e., the average number of minutes studied 
in the last week prior to the exam, seems to positively affect performance to some extent.16 
However, this result is not robust to controlling for other covariates, like talent.17 Hence, we 
conclude that we do not find strong evidence for a positive relationship between effort and 
performance. This might be due to the fact that effort and talent can be substitutes as well as 
complements, which might vary across students. Alternatively, learning methods, e.g., how 
the material is structured and whether students acquire problem-solving skills rather than 
memorize prespecified results, might matter more than the pure amount of time spent 
studying.  
Our hypothesis H2 predicts that effort is increasing in self-control such that more self-
controlled students would study more than their peers. On average, early effort of students 
with low self-control amounts to 57 minutes per week, while students with high self-control 
study 78 minutes per week. However, this difference is not significant.18 By contrast, highly 
self-controlled students invest significantly more effort in the week prior to the exam. Figure 
2 displays kernel density estimates for late effort per level of self-control, i.e. students’ effort 
one week prior to the microeconomics exam, separated according to the level of self-control. 
Indeed, highly self-controlled students seem to work harder in the week prior to the exam than 
their less self-controlled counterparts. Specifically, median effort for highly (lowly) self-
controlled students is 240 (80) minutes per week; and average effort for highly (lowly) self-
controlled students is 290 (210) minutes per week. A Wilcoxon test rejects the hypothesis that 
both groups are not statistically different with regard to late effort with a p-value of 0.078. In 
sum, we find only weak support for our hypothesis H2.  
Self-control and monetary time-preferences  Considering the students’ 
monetary time preferences, we do not find any effect on performance or on any other 
behavioral variable such as effort or goal-setting behavior. Importantly, we also do not find 
any correlation between these time-preferences and our behavioral self-control measure. 
Similarly to the data reported by Takeuchi (2011) whose method we adopted, most 
participants appear to be future-biased in the monetary context, while only few seem to have a 
present bias or to be time-consistent. At least in our setting, time preferences do not seem to 
be correlated across the monetary context and the context of studying. 
                                                 
16 Results on the relationship between effort and performance are not reported in the tables. 
17 Controlling for other covariates creates heteroskedasticity. We control for heteroskedasticity by applying the 
bootstrapped method using 400 resamples.  
18 This result is not reported in the tables. 
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4.2 The Interaction of Self-Control and Peer Effects 
Self-control and students’ social network  Figure 1 displays the social network of our 
students and provides a first impression of the relationship between self-control and 
connectedness. Importantly, most students who have at least one friend also have a high level 
of self-control, whereas the majority of those who are unconnected to any friends also exhibit 
low self-control. To be more precise, only 39% of the many isolates have a high level of self-
control. In contrast, 71% of the students who have at least one friend also exhibit high self-
control. This observation already suggests that network formation among students could well 
be fully in line with the BBT model, i.e., that only sufficiently self-controlled individuals 
profit from teaming up with similarly self-controlled peers.  
 
 
Figure 1: Students’ learning network and their self-control. Light-green (dark-red) stands 
for a high (low) level of self-control. Circle (box) indicates a female (male) student. 
 
 
To test this hypothesis we first consider the variable friends, i.e., the binary variable 
measuring whether a student is connected to any friends at all (friends = 1). Indeed, students 
with high self-control are much more likely to have connections to peers (Pearson Chi2 = 
12.159 with p-value < 0.001 and Fisher’s exact test yields p-value = 0.001).19 To control for 
other individual characteristics, we run a probit regression with friends as a dependent 
variable, using self-control and further individual characteristics as covariates. A Hosmer-
                                                 
19 This result is not reported in the tables. 
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Lemeshow specification test shows that all the models are well specified. Table 4 displays the 
results. Self-control and talent both have a statistically significant positive impact on the 
likelihood of being connected in different model specifications. Indeed, the predicted 
probability of being connected is 21% higher for individuals with high self-control than for 
those with low self-control, holding all other covariates constant.  
We also tested whether self-control tends to increase the number of friends a student is 
connected to. Since the dependent variable degree, the number of friends, is a nonnegative 
integer, we use Poisson and negative binomial models. Results are shown in Table 5. Since 
overdispersion is present, negative binomial models provide the best fit. Our results support 
our findings from the previous binary outcome model. Highly self-controlled students have a 
higher number of friends; and this effect is significant at the 5% level in both models. 
Specifically, a discrete change from having low self-control to having high self-control is 
associated with 0.64 additional friends. To check for robustness, we use the directed network 
and estimate the effect of self-control on outdegree and indegree, i.e. the number of friends a 
student nominated in the survey, respectively how often the student was nominated. Both 
measures from the directed network show a significant effect of similar size.20 Overall, our 
estimates consistently show that highly self-controlled students are more likely to have friends 
and also tend to have more friends than students with low self-control. This is clear evidence 
for parts (a) and (b) of our hypothesis H4. 
To test whether highly self-controlled students are also more likely to have highly 
talented friends, we ran two Poisson regressions with talented friends and untalented friends 
as response variables. Since the equidispersion property is not violated, models fitting the 
Poisson distribution are used. Results are reported in column 1 of Table 6. On average, the 
number of highly talented friends is increasing in self-control. This effect is positive and 
statistically significant, which supports part (c) of our hypothesis H4. The size of the effect is 
also substantial: Being highly self-controlled is associated with 0.35 additional talented 
friends. 
We also tested whether self-control affects the number of lowly talented friends, i.e., 
the number of friends with a low math score. As can be seen from the second column of Table 
6, we do not find any effect of self-control on the number of lowly talented friends. Hence, 
while a highly self-controlled student is more likely than a student with low self-control to 
have friends at all, the former also seems to be more selective in choosing his or her friends 
than the latter. Since students with more talented friends perform better in the exam, these 
                                                 
20 These results are not reported in the tables.  
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results imply that self-control facilitates positive peer effects on performance: More self-
controlled students have better access to highly talented peers and thereby accomplish more 
than their less well-connected peers. This is another channel through which self-control 
affects performance. Overall, we conclude that there is supportive evidence for all parts of our 
hypothesis H4 showing a strong link between a student’s connectedness and her self-control. 
By contrast, we do not find any evidence in favor of our hypothesis H5, i.e., that self-control 
is correlated among direct friends. This, however, seems due to the fact that testing this 
hypothesis requires a dramatic reduction in sample size since a significant part of our students 
does not have any friends at all. Hence, we conclude that our results are sufficiently in line 
with the BBT model to provide support for it.  
Note that a very specific prediction of the BBT model is the claim that only 
sufficiently self-controlled individuals profit from connecting to others at all. This prediction 
could not be generated by a theory of homophile network formation, other than the prediction 
that self-control be correlated among friends. Hence, since we validate the former claim, we 
provide evidence in support of the BBT model.  
4.3 Gender Differences in Self-Control and Peer Effects 
Since we conducted our field study in an educational setting where gender differences 
typically play an important role, we also investigate whether and how female students differ 
from male students in self-control, peer effects and performance. 
Table 7 and Figure 3 display the results regarding self-control. Female students are 
significantly more self-controlled than their male counterparts: females’ likelihood of being 
highly self-controlled is 37,5 % higher than males’, holding the other covariates constant. 
Moreover, comparing the probabilities of being highly self-controlled between female and 
male students for different levels of talent, as we do in Figure 3, reveals, first, that the 
predicted values of being highly self-controlled are higher for female students for all levels of 
talent. Second, men’s fitted probability of being highly self-controlled increases much more 
strongly in talent than women’s, i.e. the men’s slope is steeper. One possible explanation 
could be that women partly use self-control as a substitute for talent while men’s self-control 
and talent are complements. 
To test whether this notable advantage over their male peers gives female students a 
head-start in the exam, we conducted a Wilcoxon rank-sum test which is displayed in Table 3. 
Moreover, we controlled for gender when examining determinants of students’ performance 
(see all model specifications in Table 2). As can be seen from both tables, our findings do not 
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indicate that women outperform men. If anything, men perform better than women. Hence, 
we conclude that the advantage of female students in terms of self-control must be 
counterbalanced by some disadvantage either in other determinants of performance or in the 
way in which self-control is used to increase performance. A second Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
which is displayed in Table 3 reveals that women seem to scribe somewhat lower math scores 
than men, but this is not significant. Hence, we cannot conclude that women have a 
disadvantage in talent. Regarding their social network, neither are female students 
significantly less likely to have friends, nor do numbers of friends differ significantly between 
the sexes, as can be seen from Tables 4 and 5. This is already an interesting observation, since 
one could expect the (more self-controlled) female students to be more likely than the male 
students to be connected to friends at all, given that self-control turned out to be an important 
determinant of connectedness. However, if we look deeper into the way in which female and 
male students form their social network, an interesting gender difference emerges that 
possibly counteracts the women’s advantage in self-control: We find a compositional 
difference in how female and male students have formed their network. Female students seem 
less selective than male students in choosing their friends since there is a strong negative 
impact of being female on the number of talented friends which is significant at the 1% level 
(cf. Table 6). In particular, female students have 0.4 fewer highly talented friends compared to 
male students.  
Hence, female students, although more self-controlled on average than male students, 
seem to use their self-control less efficiently to get access to highly talented peers and hence 
profit less from positive peer effects on performance.21 This might be at least one possible 
reason why women, albeit more self-controlled than men, do not outperform the latter in the 
exam.22  
5 Self-Control and “Good News” about Peers 
5.1 Experimental Intervention 
In the BBT model, a specific mechanism makes sufficiently self-controlled individuals want 
to team up with peers who have similar levels of self-control. This mechanism is part of the 
                                                 
21 This finding seems to be very much in line with the empirical results of Lalanne and Seabright (2013) and the 
experimental findings of Friebel et al. (2013). Lalanne and Seabright (2013) find that the presence of influential 
individuals in a cohort of employees improves men’s wages much more strongly than women’s. Friebel et al. 
find that men’s network formation is more reactive to short-term benefits (i.e., payoffs) than women’s. 
22 Obviously, there are other possible explanations, for example that women perform worse than equally talented 
men in competitive environments (see, e.g., Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund, 
(2007), and Jurajda and Münich (2011)). 
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so-called “good news” equilibrium: Individuals correctly expect to learn more often than not 
that their peers have resisted temptations. This increases their confidence in their own self-
control and finally enhances their future resistance against temptations. To address the 
question whether a similar cognitive mechanism makes our students appreciate highly self-
controlled peers, we implemented an experimental intervention in the second wave of our 
study, where we communicate “good news” about their peers’ self-control.  
In each tutorial group, we informed the students about the current study time (elicited 
in wave 1) of the most hard-working peers within their tutorial. Since students with low 
ambitions might not respond to information about the effort of extremely ambitious students, 
we communicated two signals in each tutorial: the current study time of the most hard-
working non-ambitious peer (low stimulus) and the current study time of the most hard-
working ambitious peer (high stimulus), where students are categorized as ambitious if they 
aspired to a grade better or equal to 2.3.23 Thus, the variable stimulus assigns to each student 
the maximal early effort of the peer in the tutorial with the same ambition, which in each 
tutorial is lower for non-ambitious students than for ambitious students.  
After receiving the stimulus, all students in the tutorial group were required to define 
how many minutes per week (on average) they planned to study from then on until the 
exam.24 We used this survey to test whether students’ goal setting behavior (their planned 
effort) and their actual late effort depended on the stimulus. Those students whose early effort 
was used as stimulus are excluded from the analysis.  
To see how this relates to theory, note that the stimulus provided to our students was 
“good news” about an anonymous peer in their group who studied harder than they did while 
exhibiting a similar ambition. Hence, the stimulus suggested that this peer was better than the 
others in the group in resisting the usual temptations that divert students from work. 
According to the BBT model, this good news should enhance a student’s confidence in her 
own self-control and thereby her willingness to persevere. Hence, we conjectured that late 
effort increases in the stimulus, i.e., that students studied harder in the week prior to the exam 
if the student of their tutorial group whose early effort was used as stimulus had studied hard 
in the early weeks of the course. Moreover, note that according to Koch and Nafziger (2011), 
setting oneself a goal works as partial commitment since it creates psychological costs of 
falling short of the goal. Hence, the more confident a student is that she has self-control, the 
higher the goals are that she can optimally set for herself. Therefore, we also conjectured that 
                                                 
23 The grade 2.7 in the German grading system would correspond to A- in the US grading system.  
24 This was long before students reported on how many time they really invested one week before the exam. 
19 
 
planned effort increases in the effort that we revealed as stimulus. Taken together, our 
conjectures are equivalent to our hypothesis H5.  
5.2 Empirical Strategy 
A peer effect is prevalent if a students’ current effort affects the goal setting behavior of the 
other students in her tutorial group. The clean and causal identification of peer effects on 
individual behavior is subject to numerous challenges. In his seminal contribution, Manski 
(1993) mentions two effects that cannot easily be separated from the true (endogenous) peer 
effect: contextual (exogenous) effects and correlated effects. In our setting, contextual effects 
would occur if a student’s planned effort varied with the exogenous characteristics of her 
tutorial group, e.g., with characteristics of the tutor or the time when the tutorial was 
scheduled. By contrast, a correlated effect would be present if students’ effort plans were 
more strongly correlated within a tutorial group than within the whole sample, because 
students with similar characteristics, such as talent or ambition, selected themselves into the 
same tutorial group. Both the contextual and the correlated effects differ from the true peer 
effects with respect to causality: Individual behavior is directly influenced by a peer’s 
behavior if the relationship between the two is a peer effect, but not if it is a contextual or 
correlated effect.  
Note that by our experimental design, the relationship between the stimulus and 
planned effort is directed: While students reacted to the stimulus when reporting their planned 
effort, the students whose early effort was used as stimulus had no information about the 
future effort plans of other students in her group when reporting her current effort. Hence, if 
the relation between the stimulus and individual planned effort can be interpreted as causal, 
the plausible interpretation is that the stimulus had a causal impact on planned effort, rather 
than vice versa. 
Consider now the distinction between a peer effect, on the one hand, and a contextual 
or correlated effect, on the other hand. Our stimulus variable measures individual effort of one 
student rather than average group effort. Hence, the stimulus variable does not directly 
capture group characteristics. Still, the stimulus might vary with group characteristics. For 
instance, the current effort used as stimulus might be higher in tutorials with charismatic 
tutors or less talented students. In this case, the effect of the stimulus on students’ planned 
effort could be confounded with the effect of group characteristics on both the stimulus and 
planned effort. To empirically isolate the (endogenous) peer effect, we introduce cluster fixed 
effects with a cluster dummy variables model as described in Cameron and Trivedi (2005). 
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The model, estimated via OLS, includes a tutorial-specific fixed effect and allows for 
correlations between the responses of students in the same tutorial.  
Moreover, we test whether students self-selected into tutorial groups based on effort or 
talent. Simple bivariate distribution plots do not reveal any initial self-selection, neither with 
regard to effort, not with regard to talent.25 Students with higher current study time or with a 
higher level of talent do not seem to have selected themselves into a particular tutorial group. 
We confirm these preliminary indications with a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of population rank 
test and simultaneously test the equality of the early effort (respectively math) distribution 
across all tutorials. The null hypothesis that effort (math) is equal across all tutorials cannot be 
rejected. Overall, we are confident that we are able to separate peer effects from contextual 
and correlated effects. 
5.3 Results 
Table 8 reports the results from OLS regressions with included tutorial dummies. Our 
estimates are robust to five different outlier measures: dfits based on Welsch and Kuh (1977), 
a less restrictive dfits to exclude less extreme outliers, leverage, Cook’s D influence statistic 
and studentized (jackknifed) residuals. The minimum number of outliers removed is three, the 
maximum is seven. The effect of the stimulus is highly significant and positively affects 
student’s planned effort regardless of the calculated outlier statistic. These results indicate that 
students indeed adapt their goals upward in reaction to “good news” about the self-control of 
their peers. However, although tutorial dummies are jointly significant only when the 
jackknifed residual statistic is used (column 6), tutorial dependencies exist because standard 
errors are smaller in regressions when tutorial dummies are excluded. Hence, we find both 
peer effects and correlated effects on planned effort.  
6 Discussion 
We have conducted a field study to shed light on the interaction between self-control 
and peer effects. Our main contribution is to show that there exists a significant and sizable 
relation between connectedness to peers and self-controlled behavior. More self-controlled 
students are more likely to be connected and tend to have both more friends in total and more 
highly talented friends than their less self-controlled counterparts. Moreover, the connection 
to highly talented peers is an additional channel through which self-control positively affects 
performance. We also find gender differences: Female students are more self-controlled than 
                                                 
25 Bivariate distribution plots are not displayed. 
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their male counterparts, but do not outperform the latter although they seem to be equally 
talented. One possible reason is that female students seem to be less selective in their 
connections to peers. Although they have roughly the same number of friends as male 
students, they have fewer highly talented friends. 
Our main finding of a positive relation between connectedness to peers and self-
controlled behavior is in line with the theory provided by Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole 
(2005). This theory predicts that only individuals with a sufficiently high prior probability of 
being self-controlled profit from teaming up with each other. This is because teaming up is 
helpful only if “good news” about the level of self-control of the other team members is 
sufficiently likely. Hence, if social network formation is endogenous and individuals link 
strategically (cf. Jackson and Wolinski, 1996), then the individuals with higher levels of prior 
self-control will choose to team up with each other whereas those with low levels of prior 
self-control will stay alone. Our findings are fully consistent with this prediction.  
However, it remains an open question whether the theory provided by Battaglini, 
Bénabou and Tirole (2005) is the unique explanation of our results. Within the framework of 
our current study, we cannot identify the direction of causality between having friends and 
being highly self-controlled. Put differently, we cannot be sure that the social network of our 
experimental subjects is indeed endogenous and affected by individual levels of self-control. 
One possible alternative interpretation would be that students’ social network (which might be 
exogenous) affects the degree to which students behave in a self-controlled manner. For 
instance, having friends with whom study activities are coordinated might serve as a 
commitment device that helps students to exhibit self-controlled behavior. In that view, it is 
rather the fact of being observed by peers than observing them that affects self-control. The 
results of our intervention which confronted the students with self-controlled behavior of their 
peers show that an effect of the former type (observing) is present, without excluding the 
possibility of the latter effect (being observed). In order to finally identify the direction of 
causality between having friends and being highly self-controlled, we would need an 
independent measure of students’ time preferences that correlates with observed behavior. We 
did not find any correlation between monetary time preferences and observed behavior of our 
students, but this does not imply that such an independent measure does not exist. We leave it 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable # of obs. # of obs. if var =1 Mean Std. dev. p50 Min Max
micro score (performance) 96 - 56.59 20.70 58 0 88
math score (talent) 100 - 48.19 20.80 51 0 82
effort (minutes per week) 70 - 70.28 67.20 60 0 360
self control (1=yes) 117 63 0.54 0.50 1 0 1
gender (1=female) 117 52 0.44 0.50 0 0 1
friends (1= at least one friend) 117 55 0.47 0.50 0 0 1
degree 117 23 0.94 1.33 0 0 7
Notes: Calculation based on data collected in spring and summer 2013. Sample includes first year economics students. Variables
micro score, math score and effort are metric. The construction of self control is described in detail in section 3.2. The variable
gender is binary and 44% of the students are female. The variable friends is binary as well. 55 students reported to have
studied with at least one friend for the micro course. The count variable degree gives the number of friends a student has.
Table 2: Self control, Talented Peers and Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS FGLS OLS FGLS
micro score micro score micro score micro score micro score
self control (1=yes) 8.896* 8.553* 7.974** 7.125 6.831*
(4.737) (4.932) (3.734) (4.854) (3.760)
math score 0.580*** 0.579*** 0.578*** 0.580*** 0.580***
(0.110) (0.111) (0.086) (0.105) (0.084)
gender (1=female) -4.251 -4.008 -4.089 -2.111 -2.230
(4.413) (4.484) (3.300) (4.426) (3.376)
degree 0.574 1.097
(1.194) (1.126)
talented friends 4.340** 4.067**
(1.938) (1.962)
constant 23.805*** 23.300*** 23.142*** 21.807*** 22.188***
(6.385) (6.471) (5.489) (6.225) (5.337)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R2 0.422 0.417 0.436 0.441 0.460
F-statistic 22.743 17.276 17.836 18.837 19.540
p value F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Dependant variable is the score obtained in microeconomics I exam. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Feasible generalized
least square (FGLS) is calculated with a skedasticity function that includes math score and self control.
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Table 3: Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) Tests
performance by gender observations rank sum expected
male 55 2915.5 2667.5
female 41 1740.5 1988.5
combined 96 4656 4656
z value 1.838
p value of z 0.0661
talent by gender
male 61 3310.5 3080.5
female 39 1739.5 1969.5
combined 100 5050 5050
z value 1.626
p value of z 0.1040
performance by early submission+ workshop attendance
yes (both criteria fulfilled) 31 1980 1829
no (only one or none criterion fulfilled) 86 4923 5074
combined 117 6903 6903
z value -0.933
p value of z 0.3509
Notes: Performance is measured with the score obtained in Microeconomics I exam. Talent is measured with score
obtained in Math exam. Results on performance and talent indicate, if anything, higher levels for men. There is no
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Figure 2: Effort (week before exam) and Self control
Notes: The figure gives kernel density estimates for effort (minutes studied per week one week before the exam took
place) for the self-controlled and not self-controlled cohorts. One outlier is excluded. The bandwidth is 90. Dashed
vertical lines give the average effort, dotted lines give the median effort. A Wilcoxon test rejects the hypothesis that
both groups are not statistically different with regard to effort with a p-value of 0.078.
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Table 4: Self-Control on General Connectedness
(1) (2) (3)
probit probit probit
friends (1=yes) friends (1=yes) friends (1=yes)
math score 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
gender (1=female) -0.077 0.081 -0.333
(0.310) (0.535) (0.728)
self control (1=yes) 0.593* 0.673* 0.602**
(0.303) (0.357) (0.306)
gender x self control -0.243
(0.632)
gender x talent 0.005
(0.014)






Observations 100 100 100
pseudo R2 0.131 0.132 0.132
F-statistic 15.368 15.429 15.893
p value F-statistic 0.0015 0.0039 0.0032
loglikelihood -59.9514 -59.8717 -59.8730
AIC 127.9028 129.7434 129.7459
BIC 138.3235 142.7692 142.7718
Notes: Dependant variable friends is binary and equal to 1 if the student named at least one
learning partner; zero otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ηmath/ ηsc: average
marginal effect of friends w.r.t. math score/ self control. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 5: Self-Control on General Connectedness
(1) (2) (3)
poisson negative binomial negative binomial
degree degree degree
math score 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
gender (1=female) -0.286 -0.318 -0.318
(0.264) (0.279) (0.272)
self control (1=yes) 0.627** 0.641** 0.641**
(0.271) (0.296) (0.270)





Observations 100 100 100
Wald-statistic 8.307 8.209 9.036
p value Wald-statistic 0.040 0.042 0.029
dispersion parameter α 0.526
p value α 0.0014
loglikelihood -143.9276 -138.8002 -138.8002
AIC 295.8553 287.6004 287.6004
BIC 306.2760 300.6263 300.6263
Notes: Dependant count variable degree is defined as number of friends.Robust standard errors are in
parentheses for the first and third model. The second model was calculated without robust standard
errors to retrieve the dispersion parameter α. Overdispersion is present. ηsc: average marginal effect
of degree with respect to self control. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 6: Self-Control and (Un-)talented friends
(1) (2)
poisson poisson
talented friends untalented friends
math score 0.005 0.007
(0.008) (0.011)
gender (1=female) -0.941*** 0.131
(0.337) (0.357)














Notes: Dependant variable is the number of (un-)talented friends and is a
count variable. Talented friends are friends that have a math score weakly
above the median of the cohort, untalented friends have a math score below
the median of the cohort. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Overdis-
persion is not present and both models are fitted using Poisson distribution.
ηgender / ηsc: average marginal effect of dependent variables w.r.t. gender
and self control. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 7: Gender and Self-Control
(1) (2) (3)
probit probit probit
self control (1=yes) self control (1=yes) self control (1=yes)
math score 0.024*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.010)
gender (1=female) 0.623*** 1.154*** 1.397*
(0.240) (0.320) (0.796)
gender x talent -0.006
(0.017)






Observations 117 100 100
F-statistic 6.754 15.663 16.439
p value F-statistic 0.0094 0.0004 0.0009
loglikelihood -77.2923 -56.3700 -56.2932
AIC 158.5847 118.7400 120.5863
BIC 164.1090 126.5555 131.0070
Notes: Dependant variable self control is binary and equal to 1 if the student behaved in a time
consistent manner concerning early goal achievement; zero otherwise. Calculation based on data
collected in spring and summer 2013. Sample includes first year economics students. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. ηmath/ ηgender:




























10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Math Score
Predicted probability, females
95% confidence interval, females
Predicted probability, males
95% confidence interval, males
By Gender
Being self-controlled at different talent levels
Figure 3: Self-control by gender
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Table 8: Peer effect and Goal Setting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(OLS ) (OLS) ( OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
dfits I dfits II leverage cook’s dist stud. resid
planned effort planned effort planned effort planned effort planned effort planned effort
Stimulus (max peer) 0.190** 0.226*** 0.242*** 0.264*** 0.226*** 0.205***
(0.088) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.074)
initial effort 0.480*** 0.519*** 0.411*** 0.513** 0.519*** 0.439***
(0.160) (0.163) (0.135) (0.201) (0.163) (0.123)
gender (1=female) 15.062 4.859 14.405 19.463 4.859 16.840
(20.368) (16.843) (19.514) (20.244) (16.843) (16.924)
math score -0.402 -1.009** -0.668 -0.686 -1.009** -0.839*
(0.524) (0.382) (0.445) (0.464) (0.382) (0.431)
tutorial dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
(five) (four) (four) (four) (four) (five)
constant 47.528* 71.481*** 50.355** 37.577 71.481*** 61.934***
(26.789) (21.715) (24.233) (25.311) (21.715) (21.776)
Observations 54 47 51 48 47 51
adj. R2 0.221 0.363 0.253 0.167 0.363 0.395
F-statistic 3.613 5.456 5.617 4.569 5.456 5.690
p value F-statistic 0.0025 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 0.0001
p-value (all tutorial dummies=0) 0.1239 0.8472 0.3022 0.2407 0.8472 0.0516
Notes: Dependant variable is planned effort (in minutes per week) the student intends to study after he receives the signal, i.e. the current study
time of the most hard-working (non-)ambitious peer. Following outlier statistics are calculated: dfits based on Welsch and Kuh (1977) in column 2, a
less restrictive dfits statistics in column 3, data points that are high in leverage in column 4, Cook’s distance that combines leverage and residual in
column 5, and studentized (jackknifed) residuals in column 6. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at

































    □  almost always    □  sometimes    □  almost never 
A4. How often did you attend the lecture (Microeconomics I) so far? 























    □  at the first date  □  at the second date   □  not at all 
If you plan to take the exam, please answer the following question: 
B4. Which grade do you aspire in this course (Microeconomics I)?  




















    □  almost always    □  sometimes    □  almost never 
C4. Please state now your goal: How often do you want to attend the lecture 
(Microeconomics I) in the course of the ongoing semester? 















































Hereby I register bindingly for a workshop supplementing Microeconomics I on June 15, 
2013. I confirm to pay 3 EURO compensation for the organizational costs incurred in case of 
non-appearance or cancellation.  
 
 
Name: _________________________  Student ID: _____________________ 
 
Date: _______________________  Signature: _____________________ 
 
 
If you do not want to decide yet: Binding online registration is possible until June 14, 2013 

















































A voucher of A€ will be given  to you online at  the end of  the experiment. Alternatively,  if you are 
willing to wait X days (from today onwards), then we will send you a voucher of B€, which is greater 






























































you  put  your  ‘accepted  delay’  on  the  position  at  the  timeline  that  matches  your  true 


































Note  that  this procedure  is designed such  that your best  response  is  to  truthfully write down  the 
longest delay  for which you are willing  to wait  in order  to get  the  larger amount B€. We will now 
show you why truthful reporting is the best strategy for you. 
 






















The  computer  randomly  chooses a number, Z,  the proposed delay. We distinguish between  three 
cases: 








today time under‐reporting X-ε 








































2. If  the random number  lies within  the  interval  (accepted delay X  in days; over‐reporting X‐ε), 
you will get B€  in Z days. Over‐reporting makes you worse off  than  truthful reporting. Why? 
Actually, you are willing to wait X days to get B€. Now you have to wait too long for B€ and you 






over‐reporting X+ε today time 












1. For Matthias, receiving A€ today  is equally as good as receiving B€  in X days. The computer 





2. Lukas  states  that  his  longest  acceptable  delay  for  receiving  B€  is  X  days.  The  generated 

















Please  answer  the  ten  questions  one  after  the  other.  Do  not  use  pencils  and  avoid  corrections, 


















not allowed  to  interact with other  students  (e.g.  to  copy). Answer one question after  the 





































































































Weekday:       Time:             Tutor:  
 The third group consists of all students that attend the Microeconomics I course. 
























































        
        
        
        
        













     Not at all willing                Highly willing 
     to take risks                     to take risks 
 






  Not at all willing            Highly willing 
to take  risks                  to take risks 
 




































not correct                 always and  
at all                  absolutely correct 
                       
 




















    □  fast immer    □  manchmal    □  fast nie 
A4. Wie regelmäßig haben Sie bisher die Vorlesung (Mikroökonomik I) besucht? 
























    □  Zum ersten Termin   □  Zum zweiten Termin  □  Gar nicht 
Falls Sie an der Klausur teilnehmen, beantworten Sie bitte abschließend die folgende Frage:  
B4. Welche Note streben Sie in diesem Kurs (Mikroökonomik I) an?  





















    □  fast immer    □  manchmal    □  fast nie 
C4. Bitte nennen Sie nun Ihr Ziel: Wie regelmäßig wollen Sie im weiteren Verlauf des 
Semesters an der Vorlesung Mikroökonomik I teilnehmen? 















































Hiermit melde ich mich verbindlich zum studienbegleitenden Workshop in Mikro I am 
15. Juni 2013 an. Ich bestätige, dass ich im Falle meines Nichterscheinens oder Rücktritts 3 




Name _________________________  Matrikel-Nr. _____________________ 
 
































Entscheidung  hat  Einfluss  darauf,  wie  viel  Geld  Sie  in  Form  eines  Amazongutscheines  gewinnen 
werden.  (Amazon  bietet  eine  breite  Produktpalette  an;  u.a.  Bücher,  Elektronik,  Kleidung,  Apps, 
Kosmetika, Musikfiles und Software, die man sofort herunterladen kann. Amazongutscheine verfallen 
















































gleich  der  von  Ihnen  angegebenen  Verzögerung  (dies  betrifft  alle  Pfeile  zwischen  ‚heute‘  und 
‚akzeptierte  Verzögerung  X  in  Tagen‘),  so  erhalten  Sie  den  Betrag  B€,  und  zwar  gemäß  der  vom 
























































3.   2.   1. 
 63 
 
Der  Computer  wählt  nun  zufällig  eine  Zahl,  um  eine  Verzögerung  Z  vorzuschlagen.  Wir  müssen 
zwischen drei Fällen unterscheiden:  
1. Liegt die  Zufallszahl  im  Intervall  [heute; untertreiben X‐ε], erhalten  Sie den Betrag B€  in  Z Tagen. 

































Zusammenfassend  lässt  sich  sagen,  dass  es  für  Sie  die  beste  Strategie  ist,  die  Frage 

















2. Lukas  gibt  an, dass  er bereit  ist,  X  Tage  auf Betrag B€  zu warten. Die  danach  vom Computer 




3. Luca  gibt  an,  dass  sie  bereit  ist,  X  Tage  auf  Betrag  B€  zu warten. Die  danach  vom  Computer 


























und  vermeiden  Sie  Korrekturen,  da  wir  sonst  Ihre  Antworten  nicht  für  die  Auszahlung 
berücksichtigen können. Ebenso  ist es nicht erlaubt,  sich mit Kommilitonen  in  irgendeiner 
Form  auszutauschen  (z.B.  abschreiben).  Beantworten  Sie  eine  Frage  nach  der  anderen, 
























(Mikroökonomik I) gelernt?     □  Ja    □  Nein 
Lautet Ihre Antwort Ja, dann nennen Sie bitte die betreffenden Kommilitonen in der ersten 









































       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 







Lernpartner“  bezeichnet.  Falls  Sie  bei D3  angegeben  haben,  keine  Lernpartner  zu 
haben, dann müssen Sie diese Gruppe bei der folgenden Frage nicht berücksichtigen.  
 Die  zweite Gruppe besteht  aus den Kommilitonen  in der offiziellen Übungsgruppe 
(Tutorium),  in  der  sie  am  häufigsten  teilgenommen  haben,  und  wird  als  „Ihre 
spateÜbungsgruppe“  bezeichnet.  Bitte  geben  Sie  hier  an,  in  welcher  offiziellen 
Übungsgruppe  (Tutorium)  Sie  am  häufigsten  teilgenommen  haben?  


































































        
        
        
        
        
        
Instruktionen 
Teil 3: Umfrage  









und  der Wert  10:  „sehr  risikobereit“. Mit  den Werten  dazwischen  können  Sie  Ihre  Einschätzung 
abstufen.  
 
Gar nicht                     sehr  
risikobereit                    risikobereit 
 







Gar nicht                     sehr 
risikobereit                risikobereit 
 


































überhaupt                     absolut  
nicht                      immer 
 







         
